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I. INTRODUCTION
Australia has made a number of commitments to abide by
international obligations under a variety of human rights treaties.
1
In
migration matters, the key obligation among these is the obligation of
non-refoulement. This is the obligation not to return people to countries
where their life or freedom may be threatened,
2
where they face cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment,
3
or where they face persecution for
reasons of race, religion, ethnicity, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion.
4
A failure to respect these obligations could
result in serious consequences for the individuals affected. For Australia,
the obligation of non-refoulement is central to the protection of the human
rights of migrants.
Australia has made an ongoing commitment to respect the obligation
of non-refoulement. In fact, Australia was one of the earliest parties to the
Refugee Convention and a key player in the creation of an international
legal regime for the protection of refugees following the Second World
War.
5
However, this paper will argue that Australia’s migration legislation
is not capable, in its current form and application, of ensuring that
Australia upholds this commitment. In particular, this paper argues that
migrants who are found to be of ‘bad character’ may be vulnerable to
removal from Australia in breach of Australia’s obligations of non-
refoulement.
1.A list of treaties to which Australia is a signatory is published at: AUSTRALIANGOV’T
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, TREATIES,
https://info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/Treaties.nsf/WebView?OpenForm&Seq=3
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6, 7, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 6, 37, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
3. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
4. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 263.
5. SeeMary Crock, Refugees in Australia: Of Lore, Legends and the Judicial Process, Papers
from the Seventh Colloquium. Judicial Conference of Australia 3 (2003) (referencing
the Refugee Convention of 1951 signed in Geneva).
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Australia’s adherence to non-refoulement obligations relies primarily on
the operation of The Migration Act 1958 (Commonwealth) (Migration
Act), which regulates the entrance and presence of, migrants in
Australia.
6
It is the sole legislative instrument responsible for managing
the right of migrants to enter or remain in Australia.
7
It also provides the
power to remove migrants from Australia in the absence of a right to
stay.
8
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the protection visa
application process and removal provisions as they relate to migrants of
“bad character.” This paper will illustrate the operation of the provisions
through their application to a “hypothetical applicant” created for the
purpose of explanation.
This analysis will illustrate that migrants who are owed non-refoulement
obligations by Australia can be removed in breach of those obligations,
creating the potential for grave impacts on the human rights of migrants
in Australia. This paper will conclude that major reform of the Migration
Act is required to protect the human rights of migrants who are covered
by Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. In addition, this paper will
introduce a lack of clarity surrounding the operation of the provisions of
the Migration Act, the outcome for migrants who are owed non-refoulement
obligations, and Australia’s intention and commitment with respect to
the removal of migrants in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations. This creates the opportunity for the resulting human rights
breaches to occur in the absence of critical analysis or discussion.
II. NON-REFOULEMENT: PROTECTING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Doctrine of Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of
international law.
9
Although not the sole mechanism for the protection
of the human rights of migrants, the obligation of non-refoulement forms a
vital element of the international communities’ protection of those
6. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 4 (Austl.).
7. Id.
8. Id. s 198.
9. See generally JANE MCADAM & GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 211–15 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that non-refoulement must be
considered under non-binding declarations and resolutions).
262 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:2
rights.
10
The term “non-refoulement” derives from the word refouler in
French, meaning to drive back or repel.
11
The term refers to a doctrine
in international law that restricts the rights of states to “expel or return”
migrants in cases where their “life or freedom” would be threatened.
12
In
so doing, this doctrine forms an essential mechanism by which to prevent
the forced return of migrants to serious harm or death.
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations arise from the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951,
13
as amended by the Optional
Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967
14
(collectively referred to as the Refugee Convention). This Convention
forms the cornerstone for the protection of the human rights of
migrants.
15
Since the drafting of the Refugee Convention, the doctrine of
non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention has become part of
customary international law,
16
binding all states even where they are not
10. See id. (observing that non-refoulement is key part of customary international
law).
11. See id. at 201 (stating that refoulement should be distinguished from deportation
or expulsion because it refers only to persons who are present illegally).
12. See generally id. at 211–15 (noting multiple sources and developments of the
principle of non-refoulement).
13. Convention relating to Refugee Status, supra note 4, art. 33.
14. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees pmbl., Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 263.
15. Walter Kalin, Art. 33(1) 1951 Convention, in THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 1334––35
(Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2011) (noting the protection of refugees and asylum
seekers from refoulement is a critical function of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights).
16. See MCADAM & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 211–15 (noting continued
codification of non-refoulement in international law); see also U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, Summary Conclusions: Exclusion From Refugee Status, Expert Roundtable, Lisbon,
May 2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: U.N.H.C.R.’SGLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 545 (Erika Feller et al eds., 2003)
(noting infrequent use of the cessation clauses under the 1951 Convention); U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Summary Conclusions: The Principle of Non–Refoulement, Expert
Roundtable, Cambridge, July 2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
U.N.H.C.R.’SGLOBALCONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONALPROTECTION 178 (Erika
Feller et al eds., 2003) (regarding non-refoulement as customary international law);
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: U.N.H.C.R.’S
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87, 149, 158 (Erika
Feller et al. eds., 2003) (explaining the content of the principle of non-refoulement in
customary international law).
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signatories to it. Under the Refugee Convention, a person is able to meet
the definition of a “refugee” if he or she fears persecution for reasons of
race, religion, ethnicity, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion.
17
The obligation of non-refoulement protects this group by
requiring states to admit a migrant claiming the protection of the Refugee
Convention and to provide a mechanism to determine their status.
18
However, the obligation of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention
is not absolute.
19
The Refugee Convention contains exceptions to the
principle of non-refoulement.
20
Although a migrant may be a refugee, there
is an exception to the obligations of non-refoulement if the migrant poses a
threat to the security of the receiving country or the safety of the
community of that country.
21
This exclusion is contained in Article 33(2)
of the Refugee Convention.
22
Since the drafting of the Refugee Convention, the doctrine of non-
refoulement has grown as a concept in international law and is now
included in treaties beyond the Refugee Convention.
23
An express
prohibition on refoulement is contained in the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
(CAT),
24
while an implied prohibition on refoulement is contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).
25
Providing protection for people who are owed non-refoulement obligations
under these treaties is known as “complementary protection.”
26
Unlike
17. Convention relating to Refugee Status, supra note 4, art. 33.
18. SeeMCADAM & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 215 (noting that restrictions
imposed by non-refoulement do not mean there is a guaranteed right to admission).
19. See id. at 215 (noting that non-refoulement only implicates a temporary right to
admission).
20. Convention relating to Refugee Status, supra note 4, art. 33.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generallyMCADAM&GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 211–15 (detailing the
development and codification of the non-refoulement in international law).
24. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 3, art. 3; see also Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra
note 16, at 149, 158 (reasserting that non-refoulement is considered customary
international law).
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7; see
also Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 158 (noting that the prohibition against
torture inherently implies the principle of non-refoulement).
26. See MCADAM & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 285 (noting complementary
protection refers to the wider scope of non-refoulement); Erika Feller, Volker Turk, &
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the obligations in the Refugee Convention, there is no exception to the
obligation of non-refoulement under CAT and ICCPR.
27
III. THE PROTECTION VISA PROCESS UNDER
SECTION 36
This paper asks whether the Australian legislation is capable of
effecting Australia’s international obligations of non-refoulement. The
primary mechanism by which to give effect to Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations under the Refugee Convention, CAT, and ICCPR is Section
36 of the Migration Act.
28
This section provides the mechanism by which
a migrant can apply for a protection visa in Australia.
29
Protection visas
are permanent visas granted to migrants who Australia finds are owed
non-refoulement obligations.
30
This part introduces Section 36 and the
criteria that must be met for the grant of a visa under it.
The provisions in Section 36 of the Migration Act give effect to
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations by reflecting and codifying those
obligations.
31
The provision operates as an “independent and self-
contained statutory framework which articulates Australia’s
interpretation of its protection obligations under the Refugee
Convention”
32
and “codifies” these obligations within sections of the
Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law: An Overall Perspective, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: U.N.H.C.R.’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 3, 5 (Erika Feller et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003) (highlighting that different international instruments
have sometimes created multiple procedures for the determination of international
protection needs).
27. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 3, art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7.
28. Migration Act 1958 s 36.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) para 2 (Austl.)
(stating the purpose of the reform is to establish a ‘robust’ review process); see also
MIGRATION AND REFUGEE DIVISION LEGAL SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
TRIBUNAL, A GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, 7-2–7-4 (2019) [hereinafter
GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA], https://www.aat.gov.au/guide-to-refugee-
law-in-australia (outlining the general procedure of applying for protection visas).
32. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 10 (Austl.).
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Migration Act.
33
As such, section 36 is a provision introduced to provide
migrants with a full and thorough consideration of Australia’s non-
refoulement obligations.
34
In Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (Plaintiff
M61),
35
the Full Bench of the High Court unanimously stated that:
[T]he text and structure of the [Migration] Act proceed on the footing that the
[Migration] Act provides power to respond to Australia’s international
obligations by granting a protection visa in an appropriate case and by not
returning that person, directly or indirectly, to a country where he or she has
a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
36
The Full Court of the Federal Court in COT15 v Minister for Immigration
and Border Protection (No. 1) (COT15)
37
engaged in this discussion also.
38
The Full Court states: “The [Migration] Act contemplates that [non-
refoulement] obligations will be considered in the context of a protection
visa application.”
39
As such, Section 36 of the Migration Act forms a vital
mechanism to allow Australia to adhere to international obligations.
The first step in establishing a claim for a protection visa involves an
assessment of whether the migrant is owed non-refoulement obligations
under either the Refugee Convention or CAT or ICCPR.
40
To be granted
a protection visa, a migrant must satisfy all the positive criteria.
41
The
section has two paths, a migrant can apply for a protection visa on the
grounds that he or she is a refugee, or he or she can apply under the
33. Id.
34. See generally ELIBRITT KARLSEN ET AL., SEEKING ASYLUM: AUSTRALIA’S
HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA 15 (2011),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/158141/upload_bin
ary/158141.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/prspub/158141%2
2 (noting that temporary protection visas are granted until a final refugee status
determination can be made).
35. M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, 339 per Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ (Austl.).
36. Id.
37. COT15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148, 155–
57 per North, Collier, and Flick JJ (Austl.) (endorsed inMinister for Immigration & Border
Prot. v Le (2016) 244 FCR 56, 65, 67 per Bromberg J (Austl.)).
38. See id. (stating that there are contextual reasons to keep the immigrant detained
while this determination is being made).
39. Id. at 157; see also BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Prot. (2017) 248 FCR
456, 470 per Bromberg and Mortimer JJ (Austl.).
40. GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 1–3.
41. Id.
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‘complementary protection’ provisions that allow visas to be granted to
migrants who are owed non-refoulement obligations under CAT and
ICCPR.
42
Both paths for the grant of a protection visa require, broadly
speaking, a finding that the applicant will suffer harm if he or she returns
to his or her home country,
43
as well an assessment of the likelihood of
that harm occurring.
44
Following this, an assessment is made of the
negative criterion to establish whether a migrant is excluded for the grant
of a visa.
45
It is at this later stage that issues such as character arise.
To satisfy the negative criterion, under either application pathway,
46
the migrant must establish that he or she is not a “danger to the Australia
community” if he or she has been convicted of a “particularly serious
crime.”
47
This wording reflects directly the wording of Article 33(2) of
the Refugee Convention, which states that a receiving country does not
owe non-refoulement obligations to a migrant who threatens the community
of the country.
48
42. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) para 63 (Austl.).
43. Migration Act 1958 ss 5J(4)(b), 36(2)(aa) (for refugee ground the harm must be
serious as defined in Section 5J(4)(b) of the Migration Act; for complementary
protection the harm must be significant as defined in Section 36(aa) of the Migration
Act).
44. Id. ss 5(H)(1), 5(J), 5(J)(1)(b), 36(2)(aa) (refugee ground requires that the fear be
‘well founded’ under Section 5H(1) and defined in Section 5J of the Migration Act, and
establishing ‘well founded’ involves a ‘real chance’ test contained in Section 5J(1)(b) and
explained in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 389
(Austl.) andMinister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559,
572 (Austl.). For complementary protection this requires that the harm is a ‘necessary
and foreseeable consequence’ of the applicant being removed and that there is a ‘real
risk’ of the harm occurring as defined in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZQRB
(2013) 210 FCR 505, 522 (Austl.).
45. GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 1–17, 1–27–1–28
(stating that factors such as disease and conditions are considered).
46. Department of Immigration & Border Prot., Policy Refugee and Humanitarian, The
Protection Visa Processing Guidelines (VM 4825, 13 April 2018) para 4.57.2 [hereinafter
PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines].
47. Migration Act 1958 s 36(2C)(b)(ii).
48. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) paras 61-68 (Austl.); see also GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN
AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 7-30–32, 7-52 (claiming that it is not necessary for the
immigrant to have been convicted of a crime to make this determination).
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IV. APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 36:
DISCONNECT BETWEEN NEGATIVE CRITERION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The provisions in section 36 are intended to ‘codify’ Australia’s
international non-refoulement obligations including these exclusions from
protection.
49
This part examines the negative criteria, or exclusionary
criteria, for the grant of a protection visa as they apply to migrants of
“bad character.” This part will conclude that Section 36 allows for the
refusal of a protection visa application even where a migrant is owed non-
refoulement obligations under international law. This occurs because
Section 36 does not accurately reflect Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations. This disconnect will be illustrated by its application to a
hypothetical applicant, Charlie, who is refused a protection visa despite
being owed non-refoulement obligations by Australia.
A. CHARLIE
Charlie is from Afghanistan.
50
Charlie arrived in Australia by boat at
Christmas Island and was then held in immigration detention in
Darwin.
51
He faces a real chance of being persecuted by the Taliban if he
returns on account of his Hazara ethnicity and involvement with foreign
troops in Afghanistan.
52
He is considered a spy and an infidel by the
Taliban,
53
and he fears that he may be killed by them if he returns. While
Charlie was in immigration detention, he was involved in a riot during
which he damaged property inside the detention center.
54
He pled guilty
and was convicted of damage to Commonwealth property.
55
Charlie was
sentenced to a 12-month good behavior bond and ordered to pay for the
49. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) paras 61-68 (Austl.); see also GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN
AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 7-30–32, 7-52.
50. See generally NKWF v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. [2018] FCA 409 (Mar.
27, 2018) 1 (Austl.) (using “Charlie” to represent the applicants in the case); NBNB v
Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 53, 56, 60, 63 per Buchanan J,
Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.) (using “Charlie” to represent the applicants
in the case).
51. See generally NKWF [2018] FCA 409 at 1; NBNB 220 FCR at 47.
52. See generally NKWF [2018] FCA 409 at 2 per Siopis J; NBNB 220 FCR at 53, 56.
53. See generally NKWF [2018] FCA 409 at 2.
54. See generally NBNB 220 FCR at 56.
55. See generally id. at 48.
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damage caused.
56
In immigration detention an Independent Protection Assessor
57
found
that Charlie is a person to whom Australia owes non-refoulement
obligations.
58
On the recommendation of this Assessor, the Minister
allowed Charlie to apply for a protection visa under section 36 of the
Migration Act.
59
In determining Charlie’s application, the decision-maker
looked first to whether Charlie met the criterion in Section 36(a) or
36(aa).
60
These are the positive criteria for the grant of a protection visa.
The decision-maker determined that Charlie is a refugee under the
definition contained in Section 5H.
61
As such, he met the criteria for the
grant of a protection visa under Section 36(a).
62
The decision-maker
additionally found that Charlie was owed non-refoulement obligations under
CAT and ICCPR, making him eligible for the grant of a protection visa
under Section 36(aa).
63
Following the determination that Charlie met the positive criteria for
the grant of a protection visa, the decision-maker moved on to look at
the negative criteria.
64
Sections 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii)
65
require the
decision-maker to determine whether Charlie is a “danger to the
Australian community having been convicted by final judgement of a
particularly serious crime.”
66
The definition of a particularly serious crime
56. See generally id.
57. See generally JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON AUSTRALIA’S IMMIGRATION
DETENTIONNETWORK, FINAL REPORT 146 (2012).
58. See generally NBNB 220 FCR at 48, 49, 53, 60, 63 (using “Charlie” to represent
the applicants in the case); see also JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON AUSTRALIA’S
IMMIGRATIONDETENTIONNETWORK, supra note 57, at 146.
59. Migration Act 1958 s 36(2C)(b)(ii) (exercising the power of the Minister under
Migration Act 46A); see also NBNB 220 FCR at 50, 53, 57, 60, 63.
60. NBNB 220 FCR at 52, 55, 59, 62.
61. See Migration Act 1958 s 5(H) (listing an individual’s nationality as the factor to
consider when determining whether the individual is a refugee).
62. See id. s 36(2)(a) (establishing that for a protection visa the induvial has to be a
“non-citizen in Australia of whom the minister is satisfied Australia has protection
obligations because the person is a refugee”).
63. Id. s 36(2)(aa).
64. GUIDE TO REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 1-17, 1-27–28.
65. PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, para 4.57.2.
(stating that provisions in Sections 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b) are mirror provisions and the
same considerations and findings should apply).
66. Migration Act 1958 ss 36(1C)(b), 36(2C)(b)(ii).
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is contained in Section 5M of the Migration Act.
67
It states that a
particularly serious crime in Sections 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii) can be
the commission of either a serious Australian offense, or a serious
foreign offense.
68
The definition of a serious Australian offense is further
defined in Section 5(1) of the Migration Act:
[S]ERIOUS AUSTRALIAN OFFENCEmeans an offence against a law in force in
Australia, where:
(a) the offence:
(i) involves violence against a person; or
(ii) is a serious drug offence; or
(iii) involves serious damage to property; or
(iv) is an offence against section 197A or 197B (offences relating to
immigration detention); and
(b) the offence is punishable by:
(i) imprisonment for life; or
(ii) imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than 3 years; or
(iii) imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than 3 years.
69
Charlie’s conviction meets this definition of serious Australian
offense.
70
Damage to Commonwealth property meets the criterion in
Section 5(1)(a)(iii), which refers to property damage.
71
Additionally, the
crime for which Charlie is convicted qualifies as serious under Section
5(1)(b) due to the penalty that can be imposed for damaging
Commonwealth property.
72
The determination of whether a crime meets
67. Id. s 5M.
68. Id.
69. Id. s 5(1).
70. Id.
71. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5(1) (Austl.).
72. See generally NBNB 220 FCR 44, 54 per Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann
J agreeing (Austl.).
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the criterion in Section 5(1)(b) requires that the decision-maker have
regard to the sentence that may be imposed for that type of offense, not
the punishment that was actually imposed in the case at hand.
73
The
maximum sentence for damage to Commonwealth property is ten years
imprisonment.
74
As such, although Charlie was not himself sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for over three years, the offense qualifies as a
serious Australian offense and thus qualifies as a particularly serious
crime for the purposes of Sections 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii).
75
The second limb of the exclusion criteria involves a consideration of
whether Charlie is a danger to the Australian community.
76
To make this
determination the decision-maker used a test articulated by Deputy
President Tamberlin QC in WKCG v Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship.
77
The decision-maker determined whether Charlie posed “a
real or significant risk or possibility of harm to one or more members of
the Australian community.”
78
This involves both a present and forward
looking analysis of the danger posed and requires the decision-maker to
take into account all the circumstance of the case.
79
In Charlie’s case, the
decision-maker looked to a past of mental illness and previous violent
behavior. The decision-maker found that Charlie had been unstable due
to psychiatric illness that resulted, at times, in violence towards the
people around him.
80
On this basis, the decision-maker found that
73. See Department of Immigration & Border Prot., Policy Refugee and Humanitarian,
Refugee Law Guidelines (LS 1813, 21 September 2018) para 14.3.
74. See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 29(1) (Austl.) (laying out the penalty for damaging
Commonwealth property).
75. See generally NBNB 220 FCR at 54; see Migration Act 1958 s 36 (laying out the
criterion to be considered for protection visas).
76. This aspect of Charlie’s case differs from the case of NBNB (on which other
elements of Charlie’s claim are based). There was no suggestion that any of the 5
applicants in NBNB were a risk to the Australian community. See generally NBNB 220
FCR at 44.
77. EWG17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. [2018] FCA 1536, 5 per Collier
J (Austl.) (applying WKCG v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] AATA 512
(Austl.) (finding that a danger exists if there is a risk of harm to a member of the
Australian community)).
78. See WKCG [2009] AATA 512 ¶ 31.
79. See WKCG [2009] AATA 512 ¶ 29 (citing Re Salazar Arbelaez v Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 1 ALD 98, para 100 (Austl.));WKCG [2009] AATA
512 para 3.
80. See LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 para 5; see generally MZYYO v Minister for
Immigration & Citizenship (2013) 214 FCR 68, 72 (Austl.) (using “Charlie” to represent
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Charlie posed a significant risk of harm to members of the Australian
community and made the finding that this harm could continue to occur
in the future.
81
Charlie was refused the grant of a protection visa.
82
B. COMPARING THEDOMESTIC PROVISIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW
1. The Refugee Convention
The exclusion from the protection of non-refoulement obligations under
the Refugee Convention applies to migrants who pose a threat to the
security or community of the country in which they are seeking refuge.
83
Article 33(2) states, “[t]he benefit of the present provision [non-refoulement]
may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom . . . having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.”
84
This exclusion applies to
migrants who pose a “threat to the community of the country”
85
and
requires two things. Firstly, the migrant must be found to be a “danger
to the community,” and, secondly, the migrant must have been convicted
of a “particularly serious crime.”
86
This exclusion principle is in place to
deal with refugees who may pose a danger to the receiving state
87
or
present a future risk to the receiving state.
88
To be excluded from the protection of non-refoulement under the
Refugee Convention, a refugee must satisfy the exclusionary criteria
the applicants in the case).
81. See, e.g., LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 para 45; see also MZYYO 214 FCR at 72
(using “Charlie” to represent the applicants in the case).
82. LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 paras 182–83.
83. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook & Guidelines on Procedure &
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, at 55, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/ENG/REV.3 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter
Handbook & Guidelines on Procedure & Criteria for Determining Refugee Status] (explaining
that refugees who may be a danger to the security of the country are not protected by
nonrefoulement obligations).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 55, 116–17.
88. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook & Guidelines on Procedure &
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, supra note 83, at 55.
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contained in Article 33(2).
89
However, the seriousness of the
consequences to a refugee being returned to their country combined with
the humanitarian nature of non-refoulement obligations gives rise to the
conclusion that this exception must be interpreted restrictively
90
and with
particular caution.
91
The principles in Article 33(2) were recognized by
the delegates of the Plenipotentiaries on the status of Refugees and
Stateless persons to be exceptional in nature.
92
The inclusion of these
provisions was accompanied by reluctance and concern that the
provisions may prejudice the efficiency of the non-refoulement principles as
a whole.
93
This further contributes to the view that the exclusion
principles should be approached with caution and applied restrictively.
94
The material consideration in establishing whether a migrant falls
within the exception to non-refoulement contained in Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention relates to the danger that a refugee may pose to the
89. See id.
90. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Letter dated Jan. 6, 2006 from the High
Comm’r for Refugees addressed to Paul Engelmayer [hereinafter Letter from the
U.N.H.C.R.], https://www.refworld.org/docid/43de2da94.html (citing NEHEMIAH
ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY,
CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION: A COMMENTARY 136–37 (U.N.H.C.R. ed, 1997)).
91. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, U.N.H.C.R. Note on the Principle of
Non-Refoulement (Nov. 1997) https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html
(concluding that the exceptions in article 33(2) must be read carefully); Lauterpacht &
Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 133–34; Feller, Turk, & Nicholson, supra note 26, at 12.
92. See generally U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/SR.16 (Nov. 23, 1951) [hereinafter Summary Record of the Sixteenth
Meeting], https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/travaux/3ae68cdc14/conference-plenipotentiaries-status-refugees-
stateless-persons-
summary.html?query=Conference%20of%20Plenipotentiaries%20on%%20the%20St
atus%20of%20Refugees%20and%20Stateless%20Persons:%20Summary%20Record
%20of%20the%20Sixteenth%20Meeting (showing that in 1951 a concern about
refugees committing crimes was present).
93. See Letter from the U.N.H.C.R., supra note 90 (citing United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees
and Stateless Persons, Second Session, Geneva, 14 August to 25 August 1950, at 13, U.N. doc
E/AC.32/8 (Aug. 25, 1950)); U.N. ESCOR, 2nd Sess., 40th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc
E/AC.32/SR.40 (Sept. 27, 1950); Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting, supra note
92).
94. See Letter from the U.N.H.C.R., supra note 90 (explaining that the exceptions to
Article 33(2) must be approached carefully and restrictively).
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community of the receiving state.
95
At international law this requires a
number of considerations. First, the danger to the community must be
“serious.”
96
This finding must be grounded on an objectively reasonable
suspicion based on evidence, and must involve substantial threatened
harm.
97
This determination refers to the future danger that the migrant
poses to the community.
98
Although the past actions of the individuals
may form part of the determination, the finding must be forward-
looking.
99
This determination additionally requires a consideration of
individual circumstances and proportionality in balancing the interests of
the state with those of the individual concerned.
100
The decision-maker
must consider the seriousness of the danger posed, the likelihood of the
danger being realized, the imminence of the danger, and the nature and
seriousness of the risk of refoulement.
101
Additionally, the return of the
individual must be the last resort available for dealing with the danger
posed to the community.
102
These factors make for a high bar that must
be satisfied at international law for a migrant to be found a danger to the
community of the receiving state.
In the domestic legislation there is very little jurisprudence on what
constitutes a danger to the Australian community.
103
However, a case like
95. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 90 (explaining the application of
the Article 33(2) exception to non-refoulement).
96. See Feller, Turk, & Nicholson, supra note 26, at 12 (noting that the danger to the
country of refuge must be serious); see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 39 (Can.) (holding that the only circumstance under
which someonemay be refouled as a danger to the community is if they have committed
a serious crime).
97. See Suresh, [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 41–42 (proclaiming that the seriousness of the
threat must be based in objectively reasonable suspicion and the harm must be
substantial).
98. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 129 (showing that the danger
explained in article 33(2) must be a future danger).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 138 (explaining that individual circumstances and proportionality are
taken into account when assessing the danger of a refugee).
101. See id. at 137–38 (covering the factors taken into account when looking at
proportionality); see Handbook & Guidelines on Procedure & Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, supra note 83, at 31 (showing factors of the nature of the past crime
when looking at danger to community).
102. See Feller, Turk, & Nicholson, supra note 26, at 12 (opining that refoulement
must be the last resort).
103. SeeMCADAM&GOODWIN–GILL, supra note 9, at 237 (noting that the case law
is limited on the question of what constitutes ‘dangerous’ in the refugee context).
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Charlie’s raises questions about whether the bar is as high in the
Australian legislation as it is under the Refugee Convention.
104
Harm
caused by psychiatric illness is likely manageable, which raises questions
about whether Charlie’s removal is the last resort available for dealing
with the danger he poses.
105
It is questionable whether the harm that
Charlie poses is “serious” and whether there is a sufficient likelihood of
the danger being realized.
106
This is particularly questionable when these
factors are weighed against the seriousness of the risk of refoulement in
Charlie’s case.
The second central element of Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention exception is the requirement that the migrant is convicted
of a particularly serious crime.
107
In cases where the conduct does not
meet the requirement of being a particularly serious crime, the future risk
to the community does not arise for consideration.
108
In other words, a
risk to the community of the receiving country will not be sufficient
without a finding that the conviction was for a crime that is particularly
serious in nature.
109
The types of crime that are likely to be covered by
the serious crime definition can range and include, inter alia, murder,
rape, armed robbery, and arson.
110
Under the Refugee Convention, a
crime, for the purposes of exclusion, will not be characterized as
particularly serious merely because of the nature of the crime.
111
A
finding that the crime is ‘serious’ will depend on the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime.
112
104. See generally LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 para 48.
105. See WKCG [2009] AATA 512 para 23; LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 para 48.
106. See generally LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 para 22.
107. See A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 227 para 3
(Austl.) (explaining that a crime must be serious in order for there to be refoulement);
Betkoshabeh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 463, 467
(Austl.) (reversed on other grounds in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v
Betkoshabeh (1999) 55 ALD 609 (Austl.)).
108. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 138.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 139 (citing PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BYDR. PAULWEIS 342
(vol. 7 1995)); MCADAM&GOODWIN–GILL, supra note 9, at 238.
111. See A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 227 para 4
(asserting that a crime will not be characterized as serious merely by reference to the
nature of the crime itself).
112. MCADAM&GOODWIN–GILL, supra note 9, at 238.
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This is at odds with the definition of a particularly serious crime in the
Australian legislation.
113
Under Section 5M of the Migration Act the
seriousness of the crime committed involves a determination of the
seriousness of the type of crime rather than a determination of the
particulars of the crime actually committed.
114
Jane McAdam and Guy
Goodwin-Gill state that an approach that looks at the penalty imposed
alone will likely be arbitrary and inconsistent with international law.
115
They state that the determination of what constitutes a particularly
serious crime in the context of the exception to non-refoulement obligations
ought to involve an assessment of all of the circumstances including the
nature of the offence, the background to its commission, the behavior of
the individual, and the actual terms of any sentence imposed.
116
The
criteria in the Australian legislation look only to the type of crime
committed and the penalty which can be imposed, but they do not
include a consideration of the wider circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime.
117
This distinction between the definition in international law and in the
domestic legislation could have an impact in cases like Charlie’s. Charlie
was convicted of a crime considered to be particularly serious because
the maximum possible sentence for damaging Commonwealth property
is ten years and the type of crime he committed involved property
damage.
118
However, Charlie was not sentenced to any term of
imprisonment for the crime that he actually committed, which was fairly
minor.
119
Additionally, the circumstances of the crime involve an
113. See Peter Billings, Refugee Protection and State Security in Australia: Piecing Together
Protective Regimes, 24 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 222, 228 (2018) (stating that a criterion for a
protection visa is that an applicant has not been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime).
114. Migration Act 1958 s 5M.
115. MCADAM&GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 239.
116. Id. at 239–40.
117. See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) paras 35–36 (Austl.) (defining a “serious Australian offence”
based on the type of crime committed and the punishment of that crime).
118. See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 29 (Austl.) (providing that a person who destroys or
damages any property will be guilty of an offence that carries a penalty of ten years
imprisonment).
119. NBNB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 48 per
Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.) (using “Charlie” to represent
the applicants in the case).
276 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [35:2
individual in immigration detention, which can have the effect of
exacerbating behavior such as this.
120
If Charlie’s crime was considered
in the context of all of these factors, a decision-maker may not have
considered this crime to be “serious.”
121
For these reasons, Charlie’s
crime should not be serious enough to meet the high bar for exclusion
from the protection of non-refoulement obligations at international law.
This results in Charlie being refused a protection visa despite being owed
non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention.
122
2. Complementary Protection: CAT and ICCPR
Charlie is also owed non-refoulement obligations by Australia under
CAT
123
and ICCPR.
124
These obligations are without exception.
125
There
is no exclusion from the protection of these treaties for migrants who
have committed crimes.
126
Charlie would face harm on return to
120. See LKQD [2018] AATA 2710 at 52 (arguing that the detention environment
had an impact on the applicant’s mental health and was partly a cause of his incidents
in detention); MZYYO 214 FCR at 70 (stating that a detained individual committed a
criminal offense after learning that he would be held at a detention facility for a longer
period); see also NBMZ 220 FCR at 30 (finding that an individual committed property
damage while incarcerated in an immigration detention facility); NBNB 220 FCR at 47
(illustrating the alleged crimes applicant committed while detained at a detention
facility); Billings, supra note 113, at 231 (citing MZYYO 214 FCR at 68) (arguing that
the “character test” applies to “non-citizens convicted of a criminal offense while in,
during or after an escape from, immigration detention”); Debrah Mercurio & Fuchsia
Millevoi, Out of Character: The Impact of the 2011 Amendments to the Character Test, in 35
BULLETIN 36–37 (Aug. 2013); Melissa Bull et al., Sickness in the System of Long-Term
Immigration Detention, 26 J. REFUGEE STUD. 47, 60 (2013); Urahman v Semrad (2012) 229
A Crim R 11, 21 per Southwood J (Austl.).
121. See MCADAM&GOODWIN–GILL, supra note 9, at 239–40 (listing factors to be
considered for “seriousness,” thereby informing the decision–maker’s choice).
122. See WEIS, supra note 110, at 325 (stating conditions under which a refugee may
be denied the benefit of non-refoulement).
123. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 3, art. 3.
124. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7.
125. See id. (stating every human has a right to life and a right to be free from arbitrary
deprivation of life); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 3, art. 3.
126. See Convention against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 3, art. 3 (stating that no State will expel, return or
extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing he
would be in danger or subjected to torture); International Covenant on Civil & Political
Rights, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7.
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Afghanistan, which engages these obligations.
127
He is vulnerable to
possible deprivation of life, torture, or cruel and inhuman treatment of
punishment
128
at the hands of the Taliban.
129
This is a situation that many
refugees face. Jane McAdam and Guy Goodwin-Gill state that a migrant
who fears persecution will likely also fear at least inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, if not torture.
130
As such, a migrant who is
excluded from the protection of the obligations of non-refoulement under
the Refugee Convention may nonetheless be owed protection from
return under CAT and ICCPR.
131
However, although Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under CAT
and ICCPR are without exception, Charlie is excluded from the grant of
a protection visa.
132
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under CAT and
ICCPR are served in Australian law through the complementary
protection regime.
133
However, to be granted a protection visa on the
grounds of complementary protection criteria Charlie would be required
to meet the negative criteria in Section 36 as applied above.
134
As such,
Charlie would be unsuccessful under Section 36 despite being owed non-
refoulement obligations by Australia under CAT and ICCPR.
135
127. NBNB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 53 per
Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.) (showing that Charlie, like the
applicant in this case, is owed non–refoulement obligations because of dangerous
conditions in his home country).
128. See Migration Act 1958 ss 36(2A)(a), 36(2A)(b), 36(2A)(d) (detailing conditions
under which a non-citizen will suffer “significant harm”).
129. See, e.g.,NKWF [2018] FCA 409 para 7 per Siopis J (using “Charlie” to represent
the applicants in the case); NBNB 220 FCR at 53, 56 (using “Charlie” to represent the
applicants in the case).
130. MCADAM&GOODWIN–GILL, supra note 9, at 239.
131. Id.
132. NBNB 220 FCR at 52 (refusing the applicant, who is analogous to Charlie, a
visa despite Australia’s non–refoulement obligation).
133. SZTAL vMinister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2016) 243 FCR 556, 578 (Austl.).
134. Migration Act 1958 s 36(2C); Explanatory Memorandum,Migration Amendment
(Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) paras 87-88 (Austl.); see also GUIDE TO
REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 31, at 10–36; PAM3 – The Protection Visa
Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, para 4.57.2 (noting that the provisions in Sections
36(1C) and 36(2C)(b) are mirror provisions and therefore the same considerations and
findings should apply).
135. See Letter from Jane McAdam, Univ. of Oxford, to Alistair Sands, Sec., S. Select
Comm. on Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters, Parliament House, 6 (Sept. 23,
2003) (on file at Parliament Library, Austl.) (claiming that the Australian government
contravenes its international obligations under CAT and ICCPR by its use of a “highly
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Section 36 operates to codify Australia’s international obligations;
however, section 36 does not ensure that all migrants who are owed non-
refoulement obligations are granted a protection visa.
136
The provisions in
Section 36(1C) do not accurately reflect the exclusion principles
contained in the Refugee Convention due to the disconnect between the
definitions of “particularly serious crime” and “danger to the Australian
community” in the Australian legislation as compared to the Refugee
Convention.
137
Additionally, the legislation applies this same exclusion to
the grant of the complementary protection criteria in Section 36(1)(aa).
138
This excludes migrants from the grant of a protection visa on
complementary protection grounds despite there being no such
exception at international law.
139
The result is that migrants can be
refused the grant of a protection visa in Australia despite being owed non-
refoulement obligations under both the Refugee Convention and under
CAT and ICCPR.
140
V. APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 36: THE USE
OF SECTION 501 TO REFUGE PROTECTION VISA
APPLICATIONS
The criticisms introduced in the previous part effect a fairly small
group of people who happen to fall between the domestic and
international definitions of “particularly serious crime” and “danger to
the Australian community.” This part illustrates a more widely applicable
subjective” test when deciding to reject a visa application based on “public interest”);
see also Jane McAdam, Australian Complementary Protection: A Step-By-Step Approach, 33
SYDNEY L. REV. 687 (2011) (comparing of Australia Complementary Protection
Criteria and international obligations under treaties including the CAT and ICCPR).
136. See Migration Act 1958 s 501 (stating the Minister may refuse to grant a visa if he
is not satisfied the applicant passes the character test).
137. See A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 227 para 4
(asserting that both a “particularly serious” crime as well as a “crime that shows that
the refugee is a danger to the community” are required for rejecting a refugee visa
application).
138. Migration Act 1958 s 36(1A)(a).
139. See WEIS, supra note 110, at 325 (stating that a refugee may be expelled or
returned if there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a security risk to the
country, he has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” or is a danger to the
community).
140. NBNB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 52 per
Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.).
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failure within Section 36. If a migrant has applied for a protection visa,
and then is not excluded as Charlie was, their application may still be
refused on character grounds.
141
This can occur where the migrant does
not pass the broad and far reaching “character test” contained in Section
501(6) of the Migration Act.
142
This results, again, in a migrant being
refused the grant of a protection visa despite being owed non-refoulement
obligations by Australia.
The character test in Section 501(6) is extensive. A migrant does not
pass the character test if he or she has a “substantial criminal record,”
has been “convicted of an offence in immigration detention,” is part of
an “organization involved in criminal conduct,” is “suspected of
involvement in trafficking or crimes of international concern,” is found
guilty of “sexual offences involving a child,” or has been charged with
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
143
In
addition, a migrant will fail the character test if they are not of good
character having regard to his or her “past and present criminal [and
general] conduct,” or there exists a risk that the migrant would “engage
in criminal conduct,” “harass, molest, intimidate, or stalk another
person,” “represent a danger to the Australian community,” “incite
discord in the Australian community,” or “vilify a segment of the
Australian community.”
144
As such, this provision covers a far broader
range of crimes and behaviors than is covered by the negative criteria
within Section 36.
A. CHARLIE
Charlie’s crimes were committed in immigration detention which
means that he would automatically fail the character test in Section 501(6)
by virtue of section 501(6)(aa) which refers to offenses committed “while
the person was in immigration detention.”
145
As such, Charlie’s
protection visa application could be refused using this provision.
146
141. BCR16 248 FCR para 44 (using “Charlie” to represent the applicants in the
case).
142. Migration Act 1958 s 501(6).
143. Id. ss 501(6)(a)–(b), 501(6)(e), 501(6)(f)(i)–(iii), 501(7) (further defining
Substantial Criminal Record).
144. Id. ss 501(6)(c)–(d).
145. Supra Part IV.A; Migration Act 1958 s 501(6)(aa)(i).
146. Id. s 501(3A).
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However, the provisions in Section 501 can also be used to refuse the
visas of migrants in a far broader range of circumstances. The broad
application of the provisions in Section 501(6) can be illustrated by
altering the facts of Charlie’s case.
In this scenario we will remove two elements of Charlie’s offence: his
mental health challenges and the property damage.
147
In this example,
Charlie assaulted a friend in immigration detention. He has no history of
violence or mental health issues. The decision-maker must first consider
whether Charlie is excluded from the grant of a protection visa under
Sections 36(1C) or 36(2C)(b).
148
Charlie is not excluded under these
provisions because his crime was not “serious” and he was not found to
be a “danger to the Australian community.”
149
However, the decision-
maker then looks to the provisions in Section 501(6) and considers that
Charlie fails the character test on the grounds of his present criminal and
general conduct.
150
As such, the decision-maker refuses Charlie’s
application under Section 501(1)
151
because he does not pass the
character test in Section 501(6).
152
In this formulation of Charlie’s case, he is not excluded from the grant
of a protection visa under Section 36(1C) or 36(2C)(b), and his offense
does not meet the high bar for exclusion from the protection of non-
refoulement under the Refugee Convention.
153
Unlike the provisions in
Sections 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b), the provisions in Section 501 do not set
out to codify Australia’s non-refoulement obligations and are not interpreted
consistently with Australia’s international obligations.
154
The crime of
147. Supra Part IV.A.
148. Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (Cth), Direction [No 75] – Refusal of
Protection Visas Relying on Section 36(1C) and Section 36(2C)(b), 6 September 2017 (Austl.)
[hereinafter Direction [No 75]].
149. Migration Act 1958 ss 36(1C)(b), 36(3C)(b)(ii).
150. Id. ss 501(6)(c)(i)–(ii).
151. See PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, paras
4.57.2–4.57.3.
152. See, e.g., NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 1, 42
(Austl.); WASB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2013) 217 FCR 292, 293–94
(Austl.) (exemplifying the Minister’s discretion to refuse a visa based on character).
153. WEIS, supra note 110, at 342 (explaining that offenses such as murder, rape,
armed robbery, and arson are “particularly serious” and trigger non-refoulement
obligations).
154. See Billings, supra note 113, at 225 (citingWASB 217 FCR at 301–02 per Barker
J).
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assault is unlikely to be sufficiently “serious” to exclude Charlie from the
protection of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention.
155
As a result,
again, Charlie’s protection visa application is refused despite him being
owed non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention.
B. CRITICISMS
The possibility for a protection visa application to be refused using
Section 501 negates any work that may be done at amending the failures
contained in Sections 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b).
156
In addition, this possibility
adds another unrelated and distinct mechanism by which to cancel a visa
creating an unnecessarily complex and unclear character regime.
157
The
refusal of protection visas using the character test in Section 501(6) has
been the subject of criticism.
158
Peter Billings draws attention to migrants
who will “automatically fail” the character test after being convicted of a
criminal offense while in immigration detention, or during the act of
escaping immigration detention, regardless of the “gravity of the crime,
sentence imposed, or danger they present to the community.”
159
He
argues that these individuals are subject to refusal for the grant of a
protection visa, which limits their access to protection visas and asylum
in Australia despite being owed non-refoulement obligations.
160
Peter
Billings also argues that the standard of proof in Section 501 is too low
in comparison to the standard of proof required under the Refugee
Convention.
161
This too contributes to the potential for refusal of
155. See WEIS, supra note 110, at 342 (stating that murder, rape, armed robbery, and
arson are examples of “particularly serious crimes”).
156. See Billings, supra note 113, at 230 (stating that an individual may be
“excludable” despite being owed protection obligations).
157. See id. at 227 (characterizing the Migration Act and its operation as labyrinthine
and complex).
158. See Savitri Taylor, Exclusion From Protection of Persons of ‘Bad Character’: Is Australia
Fulfilling its Treaty-Based Non-Refoulement Obligations?, 8 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 83, 96–97
(2002) (exploring whether the character provisions prevent Australia from fulfilling its
international obligations); Billings, supra note 113, at 230 (noting that subsections
501(6)(aa)-(ab) contain a low threshold for activation compared to international
standards).
159. Billings, supra note 113, at 230 (citing the NBNB to illustrate).
160. Id. at 230.
161. Id. at 232 (“[T]he requisite standard of proof is demonstrably lower under
domestic law, compared with international law standards that regulate ‘risky’ refugees
who pose a danger to the host state.”).
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protection visa applications in cases where migrants are owed non-
refoulement obligations.
162
Additionally, Savitri Taylor argues that the
Migration Act should be “amended so that . . . the separate powers of
refusal and cancellation of visas on character grounds contained in
[Section] 501 . . . do not apply to protection visas” to avoid the
consequence that protection visas will be refused in cases where migrants
are owed non-refoulement obligations.
163
This part establishes that a protection visa application may be refused
on the grounds that a migrant does not pass the character test in Section
501(6) of the Migration Act. This allows protection visa applications to
be refused in cases where migrants are owed non-refoulement obligations by
Australia.
164
Further, it allows for the refusal of a visa based on a broad
character test immediately after a migrant has successfully established
that he or she can pass the, much narrower, character tests in Sections
36(1C) and 36(2C)(b).
165
As such, there is a doubling-up of character
provisions being applied to Section 36 visa applications.
VI. THE REMOVAL POWER IN SECTION 197C: A
LACK OF EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS
The preceding parts have established that migrants in Australia who
are owed non-refoulement obligations may be excluded from the grant of a
protection visa despite those obligations. This possibility renders them
vulnerable to removal from Australia. The question of what will happen
to migrants in this position is currently surrounded by a distinct lack of
certainty or clarity. Policy statements and statements of government
suggest that Australia will not remove migrants from Australia in breach
of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
166
However, alongside this, the
parliament of Australia has passed a legislative amendment that compels
the removal of migrants in breach of those obligations.
167
This part aims
162. See generally id.
163. Taylor, supra note 158, at 102.
164. Id. at 92–93.
165. See Billings, supra note 113, at 229 (stating that Section 501 “now prescribes a
broader range of circumstances in which a person does not pass the character test”).
166. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) para 89 (Austl.); PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing
Guidelines, supra note 46, paras 4.12.7, 4.39.4, 4.42.2; Direction [No 75], supra note 148.
167. Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the
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to illustrate the lack of clarity, summarize this new amendment, and asses
the safeguards in place to prevent the removal of migrants from Australia
in breach of non-refoulement obligations.
A. THE FAILURES OF SECTION 36
The previous two parts have identified a number of cases in which a
migrant may be refused the grant of a protection visa while being owed
non-refoulement obligations by Australia. This possibility is, interestingly,
acknowledged in a number of policy documents.
168
These examples
provide an illustration of the lack of clarity surrounding migrants who
are owed non-refoulement obligations and who are refused protection visas.
The previous part illustrates that a migrant may be ineligible for the
grant of a protection visa while being owed non-refoulement obligations due
to the disparity between the definitions of “particularly serious crime”
and “danger to the Australian community” in the domestic and
international legislation. This possibility is mentioned, but not addressed,
in policy documents. The Immigration Department’s Policy and Advice
Manual (PAM3) states that “there may be instances when a [protection
visa] application is refused but they will nevertheless engage Australia’s
non-refoulement obligations, including where they fail to meet . . . [Section]
36(1C)”.
169
The PAM3 does not provide examples of cases in which this
may occur.
170
Additionally, Ministerial Direction 75, which provides
guidance for decision-makers relying on Section 36(1C), directs that the
refusal of a protection visa on the grounds of Section 36(1C) does not
extinguish Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in all instances.
171
The
direction states that the refusal of a protection visa because someone is
a danger to the Australian community does not necessarily mean that
person will be removed from Australia.
172
The Ministerial Direction also
does not provide any concrete examples.
173
These statements provide an
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) sch 5(1) (Austl.) (Amending the Migration
Act to include Section 197C and providing that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations are
“irrelevant” for the purposes of removing unlawful non-citizens).
168. PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, paras
4.57.2–4.57.3; Direction [No 75], supra note 148.
169. PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, para 4.58.3.
170. See generally id.
171. Direction [No 75], supra note 148.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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acknowledgement that Section 36 may fail to provide for the grant a
protection visa where a migrant is owed non-refoulement obligations;
however, the practical impact of these statements is currently unclear.
174
The fact that non-refoulement obligations under CAT and ICCPR are
without exception is also addressed in policy with a number of
statements acknowledging it expressly. The Explanatory Memorandum
to the introduction of the complementary protection criteria expresses
an understanding that “Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR and
CAT are absolute and cannot be derogated from.”
175
However, the
Explanatory Memorandum also states that Australia must “balance the
delivery of its humanitarian program with [the] protection [of] the
Australian community.”
176
To address the failure of the legislation to
provide a protection visa to all people owed non-refoulement obligations on
complementary protection grounds, the Explanatory Memorandum
states that “even if a non-citizen is considered ineligible to be granted a
protection visa [under Section 36,] Australia will be bound by its non-
refoulement obligations not to remove the non-citizen. . . .”
177
PAM3
makes a very clear statement relating to this fact. It states:
The subsections in [Section] 36(2C)(b), although similarly worded, do not
relate to any exceptions to obligations of non-refoulement. This is because there
are no exceptions to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR
and CAT. Instead, a finding that there are serious reasons for considering that
an applicant falls within either of those subsections only means that they are
taken not to satisfy the criterion in [Section] 36(2)(aa) and will therefore be
ineligible for a [protection visa] if they do not satisfy the criteria in one of the
other subsections in [Section] 36(2). Therefore, an applicant who comes under
the provisions in either of the subsections in [Section] 36(2C)(b) may
nevertheless engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
178
In practice this raises questions about whether a migrant can be
removed if that migrant fails to be granted a protection visa but is owed
non-refoulement obligations under CAT and ICCPR.
174. PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, para 4.58.3;
Direction [No 75], supra note 148.
175. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) 14 (Austl.).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. PAM3 – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines, supra note 46, para 4.39.4.
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B. REMOVAL POWERS: THE INTRODUCTION OF SECTION 197C
The question of what happens to migrants who do not hold visas and
are owed non-refoulement obligations has been the subject of a recent
legislative amendment. In 2014, the Migration Act was amended so that
the power to remove migrants from Australia arises irrespective of any
non-refoulement obligations owed by Australia.
179
These changes have the
potential to seriously impact Australia’s protection of the human rights
of migrants.
180
However, there also exists a further lack of clarity
surrounding this provision.
181
Its passage was accompanied by statements
that the introduction of this provision would not result in the removal of
migrants in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
182
These
statements rely on the operation of the protection visa regime and a series
of safeguard mechanisms.
183
However, this part illustrates that the
safeguards in place do not ensure that migrants are not removed in
breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
The 2014 legislative amendments to the removal powers were made
to overcome the issue of indefinite detention. In Al-Kateb v Godwin (Al-
Kateb), the High Court held that indefinite detention is authorized in
Australia under the Migration Act.
184
This decision arose from the
179. Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) sch 5 (1) (Austl.).
180. See generally Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth)
Attach A 4–5 (Austl.).
181. Australian Human Rights Commission, Inquiry into the Migration and Maritime
Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 8–10 (Oct. 31,
2014) [hereinafter Australian Human Rights Commission] (observing the government’s
acknowledgement that the plain meaning of proposed Section 197C may not be
consistent with Australia’s non-refoulement obligations).
182. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) Attach A 10
(Austl.).
183. See generally Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Inquiry into the
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload)
Bill 2014 (4 November 2014) 16–17 (Austl.); Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and
Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill
2014 (Cth) 166 (Austl.).
184. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 657, 661 (Austl.) (rejecting the
appellant’s argument that the Court should have a fixed period as the outer limit of the
reasonable period of detention for the purposes of deportation).
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relationship between three provisions.
185
First, Section 198 of the
Migration Act provides that an officer must remove an unlawful migrant
from Australia as soon as is “reasonably practicable” while Section 189
of the Migration Act authorizes an officer to detain an unlawful migrant
and Section 196 requires that the individual remains in detention until he
or she is removed from Australia.
186
The Full Bench of the High Court
in Al-Kateb considered the relationship between these three provisions
and found that they allow for the indefinite detention of a migrant if
removal from Australia is not reasonably practicable.
187
It was held that
the removal of a migrant in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations was not “reasonably practicable,” making their indefinite
detention authorized.
188
The legislative amendments in 2014 were introduced to respond to
this case law.
189
The new provision, Section 197C of the Migration Act,
states that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in relation to a migrants
will no longer prevent a migrants’ removal from Australia.
190
Under this
new provision, an officer must remove a migrant from Australia
185. See id. at 562.
186. Migration Act ss 189, 196, 198.
187. NBMZ 220 FCR at 30 per Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J) (citing Al–
Kateb 219 CLR 562).
188. See M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144, 190–
191 per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Bell JJ (Austl.) (finding that removing a person
from the Australian territory without first having decided whether the person
concerned has a well-founded fear of persecution may put Australia in breach of the
obligations under the Refugees Convention, in particular the non-refoulement
obligations). Cf. NAGV & NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161, 171–72 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow,
Hayne, Callinan, Heydon JJ, with Kirby J agreeing (Austl.) (noting that a State bound
by a non-refoulement obligation “has no choice but to tolerate [the protected
individual’s] presence within its territory). But see M47/2012 v Director-General of Security
(2012) 86 ALJR 1373, 1390, 1401, 1456 per French J, per Gummow J, per Crennan J
(Austl.) (warning about the possibility of serious conflict between the right to expel and
the non-refoulement obligation and the possibility that the lawfulness of detention
being affected by the length of the removal process).
189. See generally Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 9
(Austl.).
190. DMH16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2017) 253 FCR 576, 581 per
North J (Austl.) (interpreting Migration Act 1958 s 197c); see also Explanatory
Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 9 (Austl.).
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irrespective of the existence of, or assessment of, Australia’s non-
refoulement obligations.
191
In 2017, North ACJ held in DMH16 v Minister
for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576 (DMH16) that the
correct understanding of Section 197C was that a migrant would be
removed from Australia immediately even if that removal was in breach
of Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations.
192
This took the
possibility of indefinite immigration detention off the table.
193
In so
doing, his Honor’s decision threw into doubt the understanding that
Australia would not remove people in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations.
194
C. CONTINUINGABSENCE OF CLARITY
Although Section 197C suggests that Australia has the power to
remove migrants in breach of non-refoulement obligations, there continues
to be a lack of clarity in the application of this provision.
195
During the
passage of the bill introducing Section 197C continuing statements were
made that the new provision would not result in the removal of migrants
in breach of non-refoulement obligations and that Australia would continue
to adhere to those obligations.
196
The Statement of Compatibility with
Human Rights states that “[a]nyone who is found to engage Australia’s
non-refoulement obligations will not be removed in breach of those
obligations.”
197
It additionally states that “the Government is not . . .
seeking to avoid obligations” and that “[w]hilst on its face the measure
may appear to be inconsistent with non-refoulement obligations under the
191. Migration Act 1958 ss 197c, 198.
192. DMH16 253 FCR at 581–82 per North ACJ (Acting Chief Justice North’s
reasoning in DMH16 was subsequently applied by Siopis J in NKWF [2018] FCA 409
and Moshinsky J inAQM18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 944
(Austl.)).
193. Id. (noting that the Minister failed to understand that the effect of the refusal of
the protection visa would be immediate removal of the applicant or temporary
detention until the Minister decides whether to exercise his power under s 195A).
194. See id. at 578–79.
195. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 181, at 8–10 (noting again
that the Australian government recognized that the plain meaning of the proposed
Section 197C may not be consistent with its non-refoulement obligations).
196. Submission No 171, supra note 183, at 16–17.
197. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) Attach A 29
(Austl.).
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CAT and the ICCPR . . . anyone who is found through visa or ministerial
intervention processes to engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations will
not be removed in breach of those obligations.”
198
These statements were
made in reliance on two mechanisms that can operate to prevent
migrants being removed in breach of non-refoulement obligations.
The first mechanism relied on to prevent the removal of migrants
from Australia in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations is the
protection visa application process.
199
However, it has been illustrated
that the protection visa application process, being the provisions in
Section 36, does not ensure that a migrant who is owed non-refoulement
obligations is granted a protection visa.
200
The example of Charlie
illustrates two pathways by which a migrant owed non-refoulement
obligations may be subject to the operation of Section 197C despite a full
assessment of those obligations under Section 36.
201
This leaves only the
second mechanism relied on to prevent the removal of migrants in
breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
The second mechanism proposed is a safeguard referred to as the
personal powers of the Minister.
202
The personal powers of the Minister
include a range of powers sometimes referred to as “alternative
management options”
203
or Minister’s public interest powers,
204
which
operate as a safeguard mechanism.
205
The powers provide the Minister
198. Id. Attach A 28; see also Submission No 171, supra note 183, at 17; Explanatory
Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 166 (Austl.); Minister for Immigration &
Border Prot. (Cth), Direction [No 65]: Visa Refusal and Cancellation Under s 501 and
Revocation of a Mandatory Cancellation of a Visa Under s 501CA (Dec. 22, 2014) 9, 14–15,
19–20.
199. Submission No 171, supra note 183, at 16–17; Explanatory Memorandum,
Migration andMaritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy
Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 166 (Austl.).
200. NBNB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 52 per
Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.).
201. Id. at 52, 72, 74–75; NKWF [2018] FCA 409 at 1, 5.
202. Submission No 171, supra note 183, at 17; Explanatory Memorandum,
Migration andMaritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy
Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 166–67 (Austl.).
203. See, e.g., DMH16 253 FCR at 578 per North ACJ (Austl.); NKWF [2018] FCA
409 at 5.
204. See, e.g., Submission No 171, supra note 183, at 17.
205. See Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 165-167, Attach
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with option to intervene when a migrant is in detention awaiting removal,
or where a migrant has exhausted all available visa options under the
Migration Act.
206
In this situation, the Minister may: allow the migrant to
apply for a protection visa under Section 36 even if they would otherwise
be statutorily barred from making such an application; grant a visa to a
person in detention if he considers it to be in the public interest to do so;
or make a residence determination to allow the migrant to live in the
community during their detention.
207
However, these also fail to provide
a sufficiently certain mechanism by which to ensure that migrants are not
removed in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
These powers are all non-compellable.
208
A number of submissions
made to the Senate Standing Committee inquiry into the Amendment
Bill criticize the reliance on non-compellable powers to ensure
compliance with non-refoulement obligations.
209
In particular, the non-
compellable nature of the powers means that there is no requirement that
the powers be exercised fairly or at all.
210
A submission to the inquiry by
the Human Rights Law Centre states:
Personal, non-compellable and non-reviewable ministerial discretion is an
inadequate safeguard against wrongful return to persecution. Strong, clear and
legally-enforceable protection, not personal discretion, is required to
A 20-21 (Austl.); Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Complementary
Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth) para 90 (Austl.).
206. See Migration Act 1958 ss 48B, 195A(2), 197AB.
207. Id.
208. See generally Senate Select Committee, Australian Parliament, Inquiry Into
Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters, (Report, March 2004) ch 2 [hereinafter Senate
Report 2004].
209. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 181, at 9–10 (arguing that
reliance on non-compellable Ministerial powers is insufficient protection from non-
refoulement under Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
(Austl.)); Human Rights Law Centre, Inquiry into the Migration and Maritime Powers
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Oct. 31, 2014) paras
41–46 [hereinafter Human Rights Law Centre] (criticizing that the discretionary powers
that exist under the Migration Act are personal, non-compellable and non-reviewable
and citing Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636
(Austl.)).
210. See Human Rights Law Centre, supra note 209, para 41 (citing S10/2011 v
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636 (Austl.)); see also Australian
Human Rights Commission, supra note 181 (citing SZQRB 210 FCR 505).
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guarantee fundamental rights.
211
Similarly, the submission of the Australian Human Right Commission
states that the personal and non-compellable powers of the Minister are
an insufficient safeguard to protect Australia’s non-refoulement
obligations.
212
This submission cites the case ofMinister for Immigration and
Citizenship v SZQRB in which the Minister decided that he would not
exercise any personal powers to grant the applicant a visa or allow the
applicant to apply for a visa even though his removal to Afghanistan
would be in breach of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
213
The
submission relies on this example to show that a non-compellable power
cannot be relied on to prevent the removal of a migrant in all cases.
214
A further weakness in this safeguard is the potential for a removal to
occur even where there has not yet been any assessment of Australia’s
non-refoulement obligations with respect to the migrant. The removal
powers may be exercised irrespective of whether there has been an
assessment of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
215
In addition, a
migrant will not be able to challenge their removal on the basis that their
claims of non-refoulement have not been assessed.
216
The submission of the
Human Rights Law Centre to the Senate Standing Committee inquiry
into the Amendment Bill makes the observation that the only way to
know if a migrant would face a risk of harm on return to their home
country is to thoroughly assess the claims; however, the submission
states that the Amendment Act seeks to return migrants regardless of
whether this has been done.
217
This lack of assessment could be very
problematic. For example, if a migrant had failed to apply for a
protection visa in the requisite time, they would be subject to removal
211. Human Rights Law Centre, supra note 209, para 43.
212. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 181, paras 25–26 (citing
SZQRB 210 FCR 505 as an example of a case in which non-compellable personal
powers are an insufficient safeguard).
213. See id. para 24 (citing SZQRB 210 FCR 505 per Lander and Gordon JJ).
214. See id. (examiningMinister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR
505 (Austl.) as a demonstration of the Minister’s personal non-compellable powers as
an appropriate safeguard).
215. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) paras 1132, 1141
(Austl.).
216. Id. paras 1141, 1146.
217. Human Rights Law Centre, supra note 209, paras 59–60.
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with no assessment of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.
218
In this
instance, they would be unable to challenge the decision on the grounds
that there had been no assessment of protection obligations.
219
Additionally, the safeguard mechanisms fail to operate effectively due
to their inability to ensure that the Minister is aware of a removal case.
The ability of the Minister to exercise one of these personal powers is
reliant on the Minister becoming aware of the removal of the migrant
and being aware that the migrant is owed non-refoulement obligations.
220
The Minister may not be made aware of the fact that the applicant is
owed non-refoulement obligations where there has been no positive
assessment of those obligations in relation to the migrant.
221
To
compound these concerns, an officer is not required to consider whether
the migrant being removed is owed non-refoulement obligations before
removal.
222
An officer is also under no obligation to check whether the
Minister has considered exercising any personal powers.
223
Combined,
these factors leave open the possibility that the Minister will not be made
aware of the case or the non-refoulement obligations owed before the
removal occurs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under international law, Australia owes non-refoulement obligations to
migrants who are protected under the Refugee Convention, CAT, and
ICCPR.
224
These obligations require that Australia does not return
migrants owed non-refoulement obligations to the countries in which they
face harm.
225
However, the Migration Act in its current form does not
218. See, e.g., Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 16, at 134 (maintaining that non-
refoulement obligations arise irrespective of whether there has been any formal
assessment of non-refoulement obligations).
219. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) para 1146 (Austl.)
220. Id. (noting that the removal officer is not required to assess non–refoulement
obligations or ensure that the Minister has reviewed the case for such concerns).
221. Id. paras 1132, 1141.
222. Id. para 1132.
223. Id. para 1146.
224. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) paras 1125–26
(Austl.).
225. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 181, paras 11–12 (noting that
Australia has international obligations under a variety of conventions specifically the
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ensure this.
226
The hypothetical applicant presented illustrates that a
migrant may become subject to removal from Australia despite being
owed non-refoulement obligations by Australia.
227
This possibility is left
open due to the failures of Section 36 to provide for the grant of a
protection visa to migrants owed non-refoulement obligations in character
cases.
228
This weakness in the legislation is compounded by the
introduction of Section 197C and the lack of any effective procedural
safeguards.
Resolving the concerns raised in this paper could be achieved in a
number of ways. First, the issues that arise could be resolved through the
creation of a mechanism by which a migrant can avoid removal from
Australia on the basis that they are owed non-refoulement obligations.
229
This could be achieved by repealing Section 197C.
230
However, the repeal
of this section in isolation would result in indefinite, indeterminate
immigration detention for people affected by character.
231
This outcome
raises a distinct set of legal questions relating to the legality of such
detention and Australia’s human rights obligations with respect to
Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment).
226. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) para 1132
(Austl.).
227. See NBNB v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot. (2014) 220 FCR 44, 52–53 per
Buchanan J, Allsop CJ, and Katzmann J agreeing (Austl.) (using “Charlie” to represent
the applicants in the case);NKWF [2018] FCA 409 at 4, 6 (using “Charlie” to represent
the applicants in the case).
228. See Taylor, supra note 158, at 90–91 (explaining that the possibility of a
protection visa depends on the ability, but not the obligation, of the Minister to act).
229. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “BY INVITATION ONLY:” AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM
POLICY 77 (2002) (concluding that current detention does not meet Australia’s non-
refoulement obligation and that further mechanisms are required).
230. See generally Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) paras
1128–30, 1132 (Austl.) (noting current function of 197C and that the repeal of 197C
would have an inverse effect).
231. See generally Amnesty International Australia, Submission to Senate Legal and
Constitutional References, Inquiry into Administration and Operation of the Migration Act
1958 (August 2005) [hereinafter Amnesty International Australia] (maintaining that
without change, or if left to ministerial discretion, migrants affected by character would
face indefinite detention).
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immigration detention.
232
Alternatively, a strengthening of the personal
powers of the Minister could be considered to create a more reliable
safeguard to prevent removal when non-refoulement obligations are
owed.
233
The strengthening of personal, and ultimately discretionary
powers of the Minister brings with it another distinct set of legal
questions. Relying on the discretion of the Minister to ensure compliance
with Australia’s international obligations may not provide a sufficiently
certain mechanism to ensure compliance with those obligations.
234
To
provide a sufficient safeguard, the powers would need to ensure that
every case of a migrant-owed non-refoulement obligations is brought to the
attention of the Minister, and that the exercise of the powers is both
compellable and reviewable.
235
The repeal of Section 197C and the strengthening of the powers of
the Minister to prevent removal are both changes that focus on the
removal mechanisms.
236
However, there are also changes that could be
considered to amend the provisions in Section 36. Major changes would
be required to strengthen Section 36 such that a migrant who is claiming
the protection of non-refoulement is given a full and thorough consideration
of their case.
237
To ensure that migrants who are owed non-refoulement
obligations under the Refugee Convention are not refused protection
232. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE IMPACT OF INDEFINITE DETENTION:
THE CASE TO CHANGE AUSTRALIA’S MANDATORY DETENTION REGIME 3 (2005)
(stating that indefinite detention would violate international law); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 229, at 79 (explaining the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s finding
that Australia’s detention policy did not comply with its commitments and is therefore
unlawful).
233. Senate Report 2004 para 4.54.
234. See, e.g., Senate Report 2004 paras 4.119–4.120 (explaining the over reliance on
ministerial power in recent years); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Ruman
Mandal (External Consultant), Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention
(“Complementary Protection”) para 185 (June 2005),
https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/435df0aa2.pdf (discussing the
reliance on the personal powers of the Minister under Section 417 of the Migration Act
to ensure compliance with Australia’s complementary protection obligations prior to
the 2011 legislative changes).
235. Senate Report 2004 para 4.96.
236. Contra Amnesty International Australia, supra note 231, at 4 (explaining that the
current over-reliance on ministerial discretion, and thus ministerial power, has caused
inconsistent outcomes for migrants).
237. See id. (calling for a formal, independent review on a case by case basis and
regular and automatic access to courts for judicial oversight of decisions).
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visas, the provisions in Section 36(1C) need to be shifted so that they
more accurately reflect the provisions contained in Section 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention.
238
This could be achieved by amending the
definition of “particularly serious crime” and “danger to the community”
to definitions reflecting the narrow interpretation applied by
international law.
239
Additionally, strengthening Section 36 would require
a shift in the complementary protection criteria such that exclusions on
character grounds do not apply to migrants owed non-refoulement
obligations under CAT and ICCPR.
240
These two changes would bridge
the disconnect between the Australian legislation and international law.
However, these changes would not be sufficient to achieve the goal of
strengthening Section 36 unless changes are made such that failing the
character test in Section 501(6) is no longer a ground for the refusal of a
protection visa.
241
The Migration Act, as it currently stands, does not guarantee
compliance with Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in character
cases.
242
Without significant changes to the Migration Act or a significant
shift in Australia’s commitment to avoid the removal of migrants in
breach of non-refoulement obligations, there exists a contradiction between
the operation of theMigration Act and the commitment of the Australian
Government.
243
This legislation, which has the potential to result in grave
impacts on human rights, contains a double up of character exclusions,
is surrounded by a lack of clarity in its operation, was passed through a
parliament that was not fully cognizant of its impact, and was
accompanied by parliamentary materials that did not accurately reflect
238. See id. (noting the changes required to conform with the standards established
by the Refugee Convention).
239. See Taylor, supra note 158, at 102 (concluding that the current application is too
broad to align with international law standards).
240. See id. at 101–02 (noting that the obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment are non-derogable and that the
current system of review is insufficient to meet these obligations).
241. See id. at 89 (noting that failing the character test is grounds for denial of a
protection visa).
242. See id. at 99 (explaining that a person who has not been convicted of a crime
may be refused a visa, which would breach Australia’s non-refoulement obligation).
243. Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) para 1129-32
(Austl.).
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the operation or potential impact of the legislation. These elements
combine to produce a protection regime incapable of ensuring the
protection of the human rights of migrants in Australia. In addition, the
lack of parliamentary understanding of this legislation and lack of clarity
surrounding its operation creates the opportunity for these breaches of
human rights to occur in the absence of critical attention and discussion.
